Using novel …rm-level panel data, this paper investigates how …rms'ability to appropriate the returns from innovation is mediated by …rm size. We distinguish between output indicators of applied research using patents and output indicators of basic research using scienti…c publications in "hard science" journals. Our results show that the relationship of performance with patents is stronger for small …rms than for large …rms. By contrast, the relationship of performance with scienti…c publications is stronger for large …rms than for small …rms. We also investigate several mechanisms that may be responsible for these …rm size e¤ects. Multiple mechanisms appear to exert a signi…cant in ‡uence, with di¤erent mechanisms playing a role in applied versus basic research.
Introduction
Do large and small …rms di¤er in their ability to appropriate the returns from their inventive activity?
This question underpins a substantial body of research in strategy and innovation. Large …rms are often perceived as slow to introduce new technologies because of bureaucracy and "core rigidities" (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) , as well as a tendency to focus on existing markets (Christensen, 1997) . On the other hand, large …rms may also enjoy a number of advantages, such as scale and scope economies in R&D (Schumpeter, 1942; Chandler, 1962) and superior capabilities in product development, marketing, and commercialization (Teece, 1986) . Size may also be helpful in science-based sectors by allowing large, diversi…ed …rms to …nd commercial applications for the unpredictable outcomes of basic research (Nelson, 1959) , or to integrate multiple knowledge streams (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Pisano, 2006) . Building on Schumpeterian research, this paper examines two related research questions:
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And if size matters, what are the fundamental mechanisms that drive these …rm size e¤ects?
Understanding how …rms appropriate the fruits of basic and applied research is important, as it shapes …rms'incentives to invest in R&D. At a broader level, large divergences in appropriability between applied and basic research may also lead to distortions in the allocation of market resources (Arrow, 1962) . Thus, quantifying the bene…ts from basic and applied research across …rms and industries may contribute to the design of better innovation policies.
Unfortunately, limited statistical evidence is available on di¤erences in appropriability between applied and basic research, and how these di¤er across …rms and industries. An important roadblock has been the lack of data, especially on basic research and at the lower end of the …rm size distribution. Most of the Schumpeterian literature on …rm size and innovation has thus far focused on very large …rms -typically the 500 or 1000 largest …rms in the manufacturing sector -which is not representative of the whole distribution of …rms (Cohen, 2010) . Data problems are exacerbated when one looks at the composition of corporate R&D. Classi…cations of R&D expenditures as either basic or applied are in fact highly subjective and prone to measurement error. Moreover, while progress has been made toward measuring basic research outputs using bibliometric data in industries like biopharma (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996) , we still lack comparable data in most technology …elds such as IT, engineering, and electronics.
In this paper we attempt to overcome these limitations by developing a novel and comprehensive database on patents and scienti…c publications. We systematically match patent data from the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) and bibliometric information from Thomson's ISI Web of Science to a very large set of private and public European …rms (covering around 8 million …rms). We identify about 15,000 …rms that have at least one patent or scienti…c publication in a "hard science"journal in the period 1978-2006. Collectively, these …rms hold 253,573 EPO patents and 58,025 publications. We are interested in "…rm publications"-scienti…c articles where at least one of the coauthors is a company employee -because this should capture a type of research which is more basic (or science-based) than that captured by patents (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) . Patents are required by law to be very speci…c and circumscribed to well-de…ned commercial applications. By contrast, scienti…c publications are not assessed on the basis of their commercial application, but rather on their novelty and applicability to a wide range of scienti…c problems. Our dataset therefore allows us to distinguish between …rm-level indicators of applied research using patents, and …rm-level indicators of basic research using scienti…c publications in "hard science" journals.
Our analysis reveals a striking and very robust pattern. The relationship between performance, …rm size, and innovation depends crucially on the type of inventive activities that a …rm carries out. Firm performance, as measured by sales and employment growth, is positively associated with both patents and publications. However, the relationship between performance and patents is much stronger for small …rms than for large …rms. Conversely, the relationship between performance and scienti…c publications is much stronger for large …rms than for small …rms. Thus, large …rms appear to be the ones that bene…t the most from basic research, while small …rms appear to be the ones that bene…t the most from applied research.
To unpack the causal mechanisms behind these …rm size e¤ects, we disaggregate the data in several ways. Speci…cally, we use information from the Carnegie Mellon Survey (Cohen et al., 2000) to identify industries where certain causal mechanisms are more likely to be prominent. For instance, if small …rms have advantages over large …rms because they su¤er less from inertia or complacency, we would expect small …rms to perform comparatively better in industries where technological change is fast and opportunities are ‡eeting. On the other hand, if large …rms bene…t from spreading the cost of process innovations over a greater output than smaller …rms (Cohen and Klepper, 1996a,b) , we should expect large …rms to perform relatively better in industries where process innovations are common. Also, large …rms may be more likely than small …rms to possess the complementary assets necessary to commercialize innovations (Teece, 1986) . Thus, we test whether large size confers greater appropriability advantages in industries where complementary assets are important.
For applied research (patents), we …nd strong support for these conjectures. Thus, in line with Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) , our analysis suggests that the appropriability of technical/applied innovations may be driven by several coexisting mechanisms. Moreover, because the dominant mechanism appears to be the one associated with inertia, our results highlight the importance of speed or "aggressiveness" in high-velocity environments, as stressed by competitive dynamics scholars (Eisenhardt, 1989; D'Aveni, 1994) .
For basic research (…rm publications), our results are more tentative. Among large …rms, publications are strongly associated with sales and …rm growth, but this result does not seem to be driven by organizational inertia, cost-spreading advantages, or the importance of complementary assets. A key …nding is that publications bene…t large …rms disproportionately more in industries where reputation is important, suggesting that publications may complement large …rms'marketing and sales e¤orts (Hicks, 1995; Azoulay, 2002) . However, we also …nd that many small …rms publish a lot, despite not gaining very much out of it and actually appearing to sacri…ce sales in order to publish. This indicates that there might be bene…ts from engaging in basic research, such as a "taste" for science (Stern, 2004; Roach and Sauermann, 2010) or reputational advantages in the markets for acquisitions or partnerships (Higgins et al., 2011) , that our performance measures do not satisfactorily capture. Investigating these issues is clearly an important direction for future research.
Firm-level Determinants of Appropriability
Traditionally, two broad sets of factors that can in ‡uence the appropriability of innovations have been emphasized in the literature: the inability of some …rms to rapidly take advantage of new opportunities (organizational inertia) and di¤erences in scale, scope and capabilities. We discuss these two sets of factors in turn.
Organizational inertia
Organizational inertia refers to the inability of organizations to change their patterns of behavior in response to changes in competitive conditions, such as changes in prices, technology, and regulation (Rumelt, 1995) . The importance of overcoming inertia as a determinant of …rm performance has been stressed by organizational ecologists (Hannah and Freeman, 1984; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991) and students of competitive dynamics (Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Ferrier et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2010) . Dynamic capability researchers have also emphasized the importance of managers' ability to rapidly integrate, build, and recon…gure internal and external capabilities in dynamic environments (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997) .
In the context of innovation, inertia can take at least two forms. It can refer to an unwillingness to explore new technological paths, or it can refer to an inability to recognize or exploit new commercial opportunities arising from technological progress. In the latter case, even technological leaders may become laggards in the introduction of innovative products and processes (Teece, 2010) . Business history is replete with examples. Xerox invented the graphical user interface and many other fundamental technologies in the computer industry, but other …rms -most notably Apple and Microsoft -reaped most of the rewards. Fairchild invented the silicon gate process, but Intel became the leader in microprocessors.
AT&T invented the transistor and cellular (wireless) phone technology, but appropriated only a negligible fraction of the associated bene…ts and actually had to resort to acquisitions to regain a foothold in the cellular phone market.
The strategy literature has highlighted several reasons why …rms may not be able to seize commercial opportunities that were well within their technological grasp. First, because change is always risky, evolutionary forces may favor organizations whose structures are reliable and accountable (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . However, the very same processes that generate reliability and accountability, such as standardized routines, may also generate resistance to change. Second, …rms with large market share may be reluctant to introduce new products for fear of cannibalizing sales of their existing products (Arrow, 1962) . Third, …rms may fail to perceive or exploit new opportunities because past experience a¤ects the way in which new data is processed and interpreted (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) . Incumbents, in particular, may have a tendency to cater to the needs of their existing customers.
This tendency, however, may hinder their attempts to serve new customers and markets (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997) . More generally, past commitments to customers, employees, and surrounding community may powerfully restrain a …rm's ability to change and adopt new technologies (Sull et al., 1997) .
The main problem associated with inertia is that …rms may forgo …rst-mover advantages. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) highlight three reasons why late entry in a market may hinder a …rm's prospects: (i) learning by doing may favor early movers, (ii) valuable assets such as scarce inputs or superior locations may be preempted, and (iii) existing buyers may be reluctant to switch suppliers. Buyer switching costs may also be reinforced by network e¤ects (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) . Overall, the evidence strongly suggests that …rst-mover advantages and the ability to move quickly down the learning curve are very e¤ective means of appropriating the returns to innovation (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000) . In the brewing, telecommunications, and personal computer industries, for instance, …rst movers and early imitators appear to enjoy systematically higher stock market returns than late imitators (Lee et al., 2000) .
In the medical diagnostic imaging industry, entry-order e¤ects have also been found to be important (Mitchell, 1991) . In short, organizational inertia, by making a …rm forgo …rst-mover advantages, can seriously hinder its prospects.
Scale, scope, and capabilities
A …rm's ability to appropriate the returns from innovation is also in ‡uenced by its size and the breadth and depth of its technical and commercial capabilities. Importantly, size (as measured by output or market share) matters because larger …rms can apply the fruits of their R&D over a greater output than smaller …rms. As a result, the returns from innovative e¤orts can be expected to be systematically higher for larger …rms (Scherer, 1980; Cohen and Klepper, 1996a ). This e¤ect is likely to be important when innovations do not substantially change the scale at which the inventing …rm is operating -the ex ante …rm size -and when imperfections in the market for technology prevent …rms from pro…ting from their innovations through licensing. Traditionally, this e¤ect is termed "cost spreading" because it can alternatively be stated by saying that larger …rms can average the cost of R&D over a greater level of output.
Large, diversi…ed …rms may also enjoy appropriability advantages thanks to scope economies in product development and commercialization. Innovations are more likely to achieve their full potential if the sponsoring …rm provides an environment conducive to further development. The diversity of a …rm's technological base, by facilitating knowledge spillovers and the discovery of new commercial applications, can provide such an environment (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Hargadon, 2003; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010) . Thus, the value of an innovative idea may be enhanced by the opportunities for cross-fertilization that larger …rms typically provide.
Finally, large size may be associated with attributes such as superior capabilities in product development, marketing, and commercialization. Capabilities can be de…ned as resources that …rms can draw upon to accomplish their aims (Helfat et al., 2007) . The capabilities necessary to successfully commercialize an innovation are often related to the possession of complementary assets (Teece, 1986) . These assets include pre-existing knowledge stocks, relational capabilities, manufacturing and distribution assets, and …rm reputation. Complementary assets are said to be generic if they are not tailored to a speci…c invention; assets which exhibit unilateral (bilateral) dependence with the innovation are termed specialized (cospecialized). Because generic assets are easy to replicate, only specialized and cospecialized assets are typically viewed as a source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) .
Complementary assets have been shown to be important determinants of the probability and timing of entry (Mitchell, 1989 (Mitchell, , 1991 , the decision to invest in R&D (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996) , and the ability of incumbents to survive and prosper in the face of technological change (Tripsas, 1997; Rothaermel, 2001 ). In his study of the medical diagnostic imaging industry, for instance, Mitchell (1991 Mitchell ( , 1992 …nds that when innovation does not signi…cantly change the identity of the individuals that use a product (so that incumbents'complementary assets such as sales and service systems remain important), incumbents typically outperform industry newcomers. Clearly the possession of complementary assets can increase a …rm's ability to pro…t from innovation.
Hypotheses

Basic and applied research
The goal of this paper is to examine the mechanisms by which large and small …rms di¤er in their ability to appropriate the returns from basic and applied research. The Schumpeterian literature has produced a vast amount of work investigating the relationship between innovation and …rm size (see Cohen, 2010, for a recent survey). However, this literature has largely neglected the role of research that is closer to pure basic science.
Schumpeter himself was mainly interested in the impact of research on industry and its implications for growth and business cycles (Schumpeter, 1934 (Schumpeter, , 1942 . He subdivided the process of technological change into three phases -invention, innovation, and di¤usion -but paid scant attention to the …rst phase. Subsequent Schumpeterian research has attempted to …ll this void, but it has largely focused on the most technical aspects of invention. Usher (1955) , in particular, characterized invention as the solution of a technical problem -an "act of insight" which goes beyond what could normally be expected by a skilled professional. This act of insight allows "a new and promising technical possibility"to be "recognized and worked out (at least mentally and perhaps also physically) in its essential, most rudimentary form" (Scherer, 1980, p. 411) . Given this background, it is therefore not surprising that the empirical Schumpeterian literature has largely equated inventions with patents. 1 Quite soon, however, scholars noted that the notion of invention as the solution of a purely technical problem was excessively restrictive. Ruttan (1959) , for example, pointed out that "the social process by which 'new things' come into existence [...] is broad enough to encompass the whole range of activities characterized by the terms science, invention, and innovation" (p. 602). Ruttan emphasized the importance of distinguishing between di¤erent types of inventions (or innovations, a term he used interchangeably), most notably scienti…c innovations, technical innovations, and organizational innovations.
In this paper, we follow Ruttan's advice and draw a distinction between outcome measures of basic research ("scienti…c innovations") and outcome measures of applied research ("technical innovations").
In line with previous studies, we de…ne basic research as research directed toward "a fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject under study, rather than a practical application thereof" (National Science Foundation, 1985, p. 221) . Applied research, by contrast, is de…ned as research aimed at gaining the knowledge necessary to solve a speci…c practical problem, often with a commercial application in mind.
Empirically, we use patent-based indicators to measure the outputs of applied research, and publicationbased indicators to measure the outputs of basic research. As discussed above, scienti…c publications typically re ‡ect research that is more general and abstract, and thus less tied to any speci…c application, than research incorporated into patents (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) . However, we acknowledge that in reality the distinction between basic and applied research is more nuanced than these de…nitions would imply. Research of an applied nature can occasionally produce major scienti…c breakthroughs, while e¤orts directed toward a better understanding of the laws of nature are sometimes pursued because of their potential economic applications (Stokes, 1997) . Nevertheless, we believe that our approach can provide a useful starting point for analyzing the issue of "basicness" of research.
Performance, applied research, and …rm size
In this section we develop hypotheses that relate …rm and industry characteristics to the appropriability mechanisms discussed above. This analysis will apply most directly to technical or applied innovations because the Schumpeterian literature has, implicitly or explicitly, mostly focused on this type of innovation. 2 In the next section we will examine the speci…c challenges to appropriability that arise when research is close to the basic-science end of the innovation type spectrum. Following Schumpeter's evolving conceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of large size (Schumpeter, 1934 (Schumpeter, , 1942 , small …rms have typically been perceived as nimbler and more agile at exploiting new opportunities, while large …rms have been thought to enjoy scale and scope economies in the conduit of R&D.
There also appears to be a strong sentiment among management scholars that the costs of inertia may be particularly large in industries where the rate of technical progress is fast. Dynamic capability researchers emphasize the bene…ts of quickly creating and recon…guring capabilities in dynamic environments (Teece et al., 1997) . Speed has been described as a key source of competitive advantage in high-velocity, "hypercompetitive" environments (Eisenhardt, 1989; D'Aveni, 1994) . Speed is likely to matter the most when opportunities are ‡eeting, competitive advantage is temporary, and there is a limited temporal window for exploitation (Roberts and Eisenhardt, 2003) . Thus, we expect the appropriability disadvantages of inertia (typically associated with large …rm size) to be prominent especially in technologically dynamic industries.
2 For instance, in the discussion below we will distinguish between process and product innovations, and between products that di¤er in the number of patentable components they integrate. These distinctions are most relevant in the context of applied research because they refer to innovations that are tied to speci…c products or processes. The discussion about speed and inertia will also arguably be more relevant for applied research because the window of opportunity for the exploitation of speci…c technical innovations is typically shorter than for the exploitation of fundamental scienti…c discoveries. On the other hand, appropriability mechanisms such as complementary assets may play an important role in capturing the returns from both basic and applied research outcomes.
The appropriability advantages of large size, however, may also vary across industries. A point strongly emphasized by Cohen and Klepper (1996b) is that the bene…ts of cost spreading are likely to be much larger for process innovations than for product innovations. By reducing costs by a given percentage margin, in fact, process innovations tend to yield larger total savings to companies that produce more output (Scherer, 1980) . Product innovations, by contrast, may be easier to license and may spawn more rapid growth in output than process innovations (Cohen and Klepper, 1996b) . Thus, ex ante …rm size may matter less for product than for process innovation. As a consequence, we may expect the cost-spreading advantages of large size to be prominent especially in industries where process innovations are common.
As discussed in Section 2.2, large …rms are also more likely to possess the complementary assets required to successfully commercialize innovation than small …rms (Teece, 1986) . Thus, we can expect the appropriability advantages of large size to be prominent especially in industries where complementary assets are important.
Complementary assets are particularly likely to matter when imitation is easy and innovations di¤use rapidly. In these cases, in fact, the ability to outsell competitors and win market share is likely to be driven by relative e¢ ciency considerations (low unit costs, dedicated after-sale services, etc.), rather than the ability to enforce exclusivity (Teece, 1986) . In this context, a useful distinction is the one between "complex" and "discrete" product industries. Complex product industries are those characterized by products that require the integration of a large number of patentable elements (e.g., electronics). Discrete product industries, by contrast, are characterized by products that require the integration of relatively few patentable elements (e.g., pharmaceuticals and chemicals) (Cohen et al., 2000) . Complex product industries are likely to exhibit higher rates of innovation di¤usion than discrete product industries because in the former case patents are typically used not to exclude other …rms, but to secure market access and freedom of operations (Cohen et al., 2002) . The necessity to integrate several patentable components, in particular, implies that cross-licensing agreements should be more common in these settings. We hypothesize that, since complex product industries allow innovations to di¤use rapidly through licensing or imitation, they make complementary assets of paramount importance. More explicitly, we expect the appropriability advantages of large size to be especially important in complex product industries. 3 We summarize the above discussion as follows: Hypothesis 1. The e¤ect of …rm size on a …rm's ability to appropriate the returns from applied research (patents) is contingent on industry setting. Small …rms should enjoy greater appropriability advantages in (i) dynamic, high-velocity industries. Large …rms should enjoy greater appropriability advantages in industries where (ii) process innovations are common, (iii) complementary assets are important, and (iv) products are complex.
Performance, basic research, and …rm size
The ability of a …rm to appropriate the bene…ts from its research is also in ‡uenced by the nature of the innovation. A characteristic that has received substantial attention in the economics and management literature is the "basicness" of the innovation. Although all forms of R&D are subject to appropriability problems, more basic innovations -where basic is usually de…ned in terms of originality, closeness to science, breadth, etc. -have generally been regarded as possessing a lower degree of appropriability, despite their often great social value (Arrow, 1962; Trajtenberg et al. 1997 ).
To be sure, scholars have identi…ed several ways through which investments in basic research can bene…t the sponsoring …rm (Rosenberg, 1990 ). On relatively rare occasions, basic research leads directly to the discovery of new processes or products, as DuPont's nylon showed. More commonly, however, basic research simply plays an intermediate role in the invention of a …nal good (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; David et al., 1992) . For instance, basic research can help guide and evaluate the sponsoring …rm's more applied research e¤orts (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004) . Basic research can also bene…t the sponsoring …rm by allowing it to signal its scienti…c and technical capabilities to prospective customers, employees, or …nanciers (Hicks, 1995; Azoulay, 2002; Stephan et al., 2007) . But despite these indirect bene…ts, basic research has generally been viewed as plagued by severe appropriability problems.
The key reason why pro…ting from basic research is di¢ cult is that its payo¤s are often uncertain and distant. Even in industries where science is an important component of the innovation process, it usually takes a substantial amount of time, investment, and e¤ort before basic research results can come to fruition -if they ever do. Compounding this problem, there is the fact that product development in science-based industries typically requires the integration of multiple knowledge streams and capabilities.
In the pharmaceutical industry, for instance, drug discovery necessitates tight integration between scienti…c sub…elds such as cell biology, genetics, and bioinformatics, and technical, commercial, clinical, and regulatory capabilities (Pisano, 2006; Swan et al., 2007) . Pro…ting from basic research can be di¢ cult if a …rm cannot master all the necessary competencies. Indeed, Pisano (2006) argues that the fragmentation of the biopharmaceutical industry, by impairing the ability of biotech …rms to learn and integrate multiple knowledge streams, may in part be responsible for the poor …nancial performance of the sector.
Another signi…cant risk associated with basic research is that valuable information may leak out to competitors. This risk is particularly severe for basic research because scienti…c discoveries often do not …t the criteria for patentability, thus legal protection may not be available. Secrecy may also not be particularly e¤ective or possible as an appropriability mechanism for basic research, since scientists' internalized norms of science may con ‡ict with …rms' con…dentiality necessities (Dasgupta and David, 1994 ).
Because of these problems, scholars have suggested that large …rms may be better positioned than small …rms to pro…t from the outcomes of basic research. Nelson (1959) was arguably the …rst to make this point. He noted that, as one moves from the applied-science end to the basic-science end of the spectrum, the unpredictability about the outcomes of a speci…c research project rises, as the goals become less clearly de…ned and less closely tied to the solution of a speci…c practical problem. This unpredictability hinders appropriability because organizational search is typically local (March and Simon, 1958; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001) . Firms often search locally because their knowledge is embedded in …rm-speci…c, path-dependent capabilities and routines, which shape and constrain the further evolution of their knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece et al., 1997; Leonard-Barton, 1992 ).
However, if the commercial applications of a basic research result lie outside the sponsoring …rm's area of expertise, the returns from that basic research investment may be limited. This problem is arguably most relevant for small …rms. Large …rms, in fact, often have a broad technological base which can ensure that, "whatever direction the path of research may take, the results are likely to be of value to the sponsoring …rm" (Nelson, 1959, p. 302) . Thus, large, diversi…ed …rms might be the ones best positioned to exploit the results of basic research.
The logic of the resource-based view (RBV) also suggests a link between superior performance and the breath of a …rm's technical and commercial resources. The RBV views the …rm as a bundle of resources (Penrose, 1959) . These resources can produce supernormal pro…ts only to the extent to which they are unique and inimitable. Given the causal ambiguity and the path-dependent nature of the resource development process (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dierickx and Cool, 1989) , however, the uniqueness and inimitability of a collection of resources is likely to be greater than the uniqueness and inimitability of each individual resource. Thus the breath of technical resources may be an antecedent of rent generation (Sampson, 2007; Ndofor et al., 2011) , particularly in environments where absorptive capacity and complementarities between knowledge streams are important (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Argyres, 1996; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) .
A third argument why large …rms may be better positioned than small …rms to pro…t from basic research is related to the issue of patentability. Nelson's (1959) conjecture assumes that small …rms are unable to exploit their basic inventions, not only by developing new product lines, but also through licensing to others (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975) . Indeed, if licensing was easy, small …rms could reap the bene…ts of basic research simply by contracting with larger …rms. We envisage at least two reasons why licensing may be di¢ cult in science-based industries. First, because often scienti…c results cannot be patented, the risk of expropriation is higher. Second, the uncertainty surrounding the potential applications of basic research may be a source of bargaining frictions (Akerlof, 1970) . As a result, licensing may be di¢ cult and commercial applications may have to be developed in-house. Larger …rms with the complementary capabilities in product development, marketing, and commercialization may thus enjoy signi…cant advantages over smaller …rms in appropriating the returns from basic research.
In sum, both scope economies and patentability issues suggest that large …rms may be best positioned to exploit the outputs of basic research.
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between performance and basic research outputs is stronger for large …rms than for small …rms.
Two important remarks are in order. First, it should be noted that Hypothesis 2 refers to the exploitation of basic research results. Thus, it does not rule out the possibility that small …rms may have advantages over large …rms in the generation or exploration of new ideas, as some scholars have suggested (Abernathy, 1978; Henderson, 1993) .
Second, although the arguments put forward in the previous section apply most directly to applied research, some of those arguments may also apply to basic research. In particular, it is plausible that complementary assets may be important to appropriate the bene…ts from basic research. In the empirical section, we will thus examine the impact of industry characteristics on …rms'ability to appropriate the returns from basic research as well.
Data
This paper combines data from three main sources: (i) patents from the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO),
(ii) scienti…c publications from the Web of Knowledge database, and (iii) …nancial information from Amadeus. Of the …rms in our …nal sample, 27% are German, 20% French, 16% Italian, and 11% British.
The remaining 26% are from the other eleven Western European countries. In this section, we explain the methodology for constructing the data, and describe our sample.
Patents. To generate a …rm-level measure of applied innovation, we follow the large literature that uses patent data (see Griliches, 1990 , for a survey). We construct a unique dataset of European patents by matching all granted patent applications from the EPO to the complete list of Amadeus …rms (about 8 million …rm names) for the period 1978-2006. Details on the matching procedure are available upon request.
Scienti…c Publications. Our second measure of innovation is the number of publications in academic journals. We develop systematic data on …rm publications to proxy for science-based inventive activity by …rms. The world's largest source of information on scienti…c publications is Thomson's ISI Web of Knowledge (WOK), which includes publication records on thousands of international journals in "hard" sciences (such as natural or physical sciences). Each publication has an address …eld that contains the authors' a¢ liation. We match all …rms by name to the complete ISI database, taking special care to exclude research and non-pro…t institutions that are also included in Amadeus.
Using bibliometric data raises a number of issues. First, a key concern is heterogeneity in the quality of publications. To mitigate this concern, for each article we collect information on the number of citations it receives, as well as the quality of the journal where it was published, as measured by the impact factor from the Journal Citations Report. A second concern relates to whether the knowledge incorporated into a …rm publication was actually generated within the …rm. Hypothetically, a new hire might publish the results of her dissertation, thus bringing external knowledge to the …rm. While we cannot rule out this possibility, it is important to note that in most "hard" sciences publication lags tend to be very short -typically a few months. 4 We mitigate this early-publication concern by showing that our results are not sensitive to removing …rms whose publications are concentrated very early in their life-cycle -a pattern that may suggest that publications were not generated within the …rm. Lastly, our matching procedure assigns a publication to a …rm if at least one of its coauthors is a company scientist. We check the robustness of this matching procedure by experimenting with di¤erent ways of assigning publications to …rms.
Accounting. Accounting information (such as sales, assets, and employment) is taken primarily from Amadeus. The source of the accounting information is typically the Company Register House in each of the countries in our sample. The key advantage of these data is the comprehensive coverage of …rms, especially the unique accounting information on private …rms. One potential weakness in the Amadeus data is that …rms which are missing accounting information for four consecutive years are dropped from the database, resulting in about 5% of the …rms being dropped every year. In order to capture these …rms we use historical data in archived Amadeus publications.
Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 report summary statistics for …rms in our sample. 14,899 …rms have at least one patent or scienti…c publication in the period 1978-2006. The average patenting …rm holds an annual stock of 7.5 patents, while the average publishing …rm holds an annual stock of 2.3 articles. Our sample covers a wide distribution of …rm size, especially in the lower tail. The median …rm generates about $20 million in annual sales and has 87 employees. 10 percent of our …rms have 8 employees or less, and generate less than $1.6 million in annual sales. As a comparison, Compustat patenting …rms have on average $3 billion in annual sales with a median of $500 million (Bloom et al., 2005) . The average innovating …rm in our sample generates sales of $326 thousand per employee and enjoys annual employment growth of 4%, and annual sales growth of 8%. In total, …rms in our sample hold 253,573 patents and publish 58,025 scienti…c articles in "hard" science journals. 5 Table 2 splits the sample of innovating …rms into three groups: …rms that only patent, …rms that only publish, and …rms that both patent and publish. The vast majority of …rms fall into the …rst category, with nearly 11,000 …rms only patenting. About 3,200 …rms only publish, and 939 …rms both patent and publish. 6 Thus, there is a large number of …rm publications (about a half) that are not associated with any patent. In terms of size, there is no substantial di¤erence between …rms that only patent and …rms that only publish (647 and 632 employees, on average, respectively); however, …rms that perform both inventive activities are substantially larger, averaging more than 5,000 employees. Publishing …rms are about 15% more productive than non-publishing …rms. Firms that only publish and those that both publish and patent appear to be similar in terms of productivity. 7 We present the unconditional distribution of the gains from innovation by …rm size in Figures 1 and   2 . Figure 1 plots the relationship between labor productivity (sales over employment) and patenting by employment quintiles. Firms are split to high and low patenting based on the sample median value. The bars re ‡ect the percentage di¤erence in labor productivity between high-and low-patenting …rms. Within small …rms, labor productivity is substantially larger for high-patenting …rms than for low-patenting …rms. Thus, conditional on being small, patenting appears to be associated with large productivity gains.
By contrast, for large …rms the di¤erence in labor productivity between high-and low-patenting …rms appears to be much smaller. Figure 2 plots the same relationship, but with scienti…c publications instead of patents, and shows the opposite pattern. The productivity gains associated with publishing are much larger when …rms are big than when they are small. Thus, substantial gains from publishing appear to exist primarily for large …rms.
Econometric Speci…cations
Our econometric analysis focuses on identifying a robust set of relationships between …rm size and returns to patenting and publishing, as measured by productivity gains and employment growth. Our analysis di¤ers from previous "classical"productivity estimations (e.g., Griliches, 1986 ) in that we do not directly observe R&D expenditures. This implies that we cannot compute net returns to innovation, as the costs associated with the innovative output are not observed. Thus, we focus on di¤erences in the private gains or gross returns associated with innovation (both basic and applied) by small and large …rms. In all speci…cations we use counts of the number of patents and scienti…c publications. 8 We estimate the following speci…cation for …rm productivity -annual sales conditional on employment and capital:
ln Assets i;t 1 + s 3 ln(1 + P atents i;t 1 ) + s 4 ln(1 + P ublications i;t 1 ) it 1 + s 5 ln(1 + P atents i;t 1 ) ln Employment it 1 + s 6 ln(1 + P ublications i;t 1 ) ln Employment i;t 1 + j + it 7 We explore whether publishing …rms generate higher quality patents than non-publishing …rms. Our analysis con…rms such quality di¤erences. The average patent held by a publishing …rm receives 1.02 citations over its life-cycle, as compared to 0.91 citations for a patent by a non-publishing …rm (the di¤erence is signi…cant at the 1% level). Moreover, we follow Trajtenberg et al. (1997) and construct measures of patent generality and originality. Patents by publishing …rms tend to score higher on both measures. Average patent generality for publishing …rms is 0.196, as compared to 0.152 for nonpublishing …rms. For originality, the respective values are 0.087 and 0.067 (di¤erences are signi…cant at the 1% level).
8 To mitigate concerns usually tied to count measures of innovation, we test the robustness of our …ndings by controlling for patent and publication quality, using the number of citations they receive. We also experiment by excluding publications from journals which are ranked relatively low in terms of quality (Journal Impact Factor). The results reported in this paper are robust to the use of citations, and to removing publications in low-impact journals.
Employment is number of employees, Assets is …xed-assets, P atents is patent stock computed using the perpetual method with a 15% depreciation rate for past patents, P ublications is publication stock also computed using the perpetual method with a 15% depreciation rate for past …rm publications, j is industry dummies, and it is an iid error term. We include a dummy variable for observations where patent stock is zero, and another dummy variable for observations where publication stock is zero. Dummy variables are also included for publicly listed …rms, and for …rms that report only consolidated accounts.
Because …rms in our sample are incorporated in several West-European countries, we include a complete set of country dummies to capture any country-level variation that may be systematically related to the innovation indicators, and the reported …nancial information. Lagged rather than contemporaneous realizations of the explanatory variables are used to control for transitory shocks that may a¤ect both the incentive to innovate and sales, and to mitigate reverse causality concerns.
Our second measure of …rm performance is employment growth:
In all speci…cations we report standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroscadisticity, and allow for serial correlation through clustering by …rms.
Our coe¢ cients of interest are It is important to emphasize that we do not include …rm-…xed e¤ects in our analysis. Very few …rms in our sample experience a substantial change in size that would allow for a within-…rm identi…cation of a systematic and signi…cant size e¤ect. Moreover, …rms that experience drastic size changes arguably di¤er from other …rms on multiple dimensions that are related to innovation and sales. Thus, restricting our sample to these …rms in order to estimate a within-…rm speci…cation would considerably reduce the degrees-of-freedom for our analysis, and more importantly, also reduce the generalizability of the results.
We quantify the within-…rm variation in employment as follows. For each …rm in the sample we compute the number of employees at the beginning and at the end of the sample. We then classify …rms into size categories based on employment distribution quartiles in each period. We compare the two distributions to measure the extent to which …rms move across these quartiles over the sample period. We …nd no mobility for 80 percent of …rms, and that even for those that move, this almost always results in at most a move to the adjacent quartile. We complement this investigation with a variance decomposition analysis, which strongly concurs with the small within-…rm variation in our data, as 98 percent of the variation in employment is attributed to between-…rms.
Moreover, our focus in this paper is on the interaction e¤ects of …rm size. These interactions are less likely to be sensitive to time-invariant e¤ects relative to estimates of the linear patent and publication coe¢ cients. For example, while it is reasonable to suspect that the unobserved quality of a …rm would upwardly bias both innovation indicators estimates, it is not clear why the same unobserved quality would bias the coe¢ cient estimates on the interaction terms between innovation and size. It is even more unlikely that our results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity given the opposite patterns we observe on the interaction e¤ects of size with patents and publications.
Estimation results
Columns 1-7 in Table 3 We proceed to investigate how the relationship between patents and publications with sales vary by …rm size. Columns 2 to 6 report the elasticity estimates for di¤erent subsamples of employment size. A clear pattern emerges: patent elasticity is very large for small …rms, and substantially drops in relation to size (from 0.463 for …rms with fewer than 10 employees to 0.019 for …rms in the upper employment quartile). In contrast, publication elasticity is negative for most …rms, and becomes positive only for the largest …rms in the sample (upper employment quartile). Interestingly, we …nd that for large …rms the coe¢ cient estimate on publication stock is more than three times larger than the coe¢ cient estimate on patent stock (column 6). This is consistent with a basic research premium for large …rms -…rst documented by Griliches (1986) . For small …rms, the negative coe¢ cient on publication stock is puzzling (Columns 2-4). It is not clear why small …rms should publish at all if they have so little to gain. One possible explanation is that publications have other, less tangible bene…ts, which are not fully re ‡ected by sales. Section 8 discusses this issue in greater length.
Column 7 includes interaction terms between measures for lagged employment and patent and publication stocks. The same size patterns continue to hold. The interaction between patents and employment is negative and signi…cant (-0.012), while the interaction between publications and employment is positive and signi…cant (0.030).
Based on the estimates from Column 1, we calculate the value of a patent (publication) as the increase in sales in response to a unitary increase in patent (publication) stock. Evaluated at the sample median, a unitary increase in patent stock is associated with a $1.4 million increase in sales (conditional on employment and assets). Repeating the same calculation for publications yields a lower value of $0.6 million. The estimates from Column 7 allow us to quantify how the value of patents and publications vary by …rm size. Moving from the …rst employment quartile (29 employees) to the fourth quartile (381 employees) lowers average patent value by $1.2 million -close to the patent median value. The same movement, on the other hand, raises the median value of a publication by $4.6 million.
Columns 8-14 in Table 3 present the estimation results for the employment growth speci…cation. The pattern of results is similar to the one discussed above. Having a large patent stock appears to be especially important for the growth of small …rms, while publication stock has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect only on the growth of large …rms. Columns 9-13 explore how the growth-innovation relationship varies by …rm size, by separately estimating the growth equation for each quartile of …rm size. As for sales, we …nd patents to matter more for the growth of small …rms, and publications to matter more to the growth of large …rms. For instance, the coe¢ cient on patent stock drops from 0.164 for …rms in the lowest size quartile, to 0.010 for …rms in the highest size quartile. By contrast, the coe¢ cient on publication stock jumps from 0.006 for …rms in the …rst size quartile, to 0.016 for …rms in the highest size quartile. Column 14 further con…rms these patterns by adding interaction terms between patents and publications with lagged employment.
In unreported robustness checks (complete set of results is available upon request) we check the sensitivity of the results to removing outliers, mitigating the concern that our estimates may be driven by the di¤erence between very large and very small …rms in our sample. We experiment with removing the lowest and highest 1, 5 and 10 percentile of the employment distribution. In all cases the results are robust. We also examine the sensitivity of our results to the timing of publication. A concern is that for very young …rms, publications can originate outside the …rm and brought in by skilled new hires. To mitigate this concern, we remove from the sample …rms for which publications concentrate very early in their life-cycle. Our results are not sensitive to the timing of publication. Section 7.2 reports additional robustness checks to further mitigate concerns about potential biases and sensitivities of our …ndings.
Exploring causal mechanisms: industry variation
Using sales and …rm growth as measures of performance, we found that, on average, small …rms bene…t more from patents than large …rms. Large …rms, on the other hand, bene…t more from publications than small …rms. In this section we take a …rst step in underscoring speci…c causal mechanisms behind these results. Our empirical strategy is to exploit structural industry variation. Speci…cally, we test a number of theoretical predictions that depend on industry features. A key identi…cation assumption underlying our approach is that by splitting the sample along speci…c industry characteristics, all other characteristics that are likely to in ‡uence the relationship between innovation and size remain unchanged.
While it is likely that this assumption may not hold in all cases, we nonetheless argue that by providing a comprehensive set of industry breakdown tests, we highlight mechanisms that are likely to drive our results, as well as mechanisms that are not likely to drive them.
Information on industry characteristics is from the Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMU). We use individual …rm responses to construct aggregate industry measures. Table 4 presents the estimation results of splitting the sample by industry characteristics.
Rate of technical change. If small …rms have an advantage over larger …rms because they are more agile and su¤er less from inertia, then we would expect a more negative relationship between …rm size and innovation in fast-moving industries, relative to slow-moving industries. Columns 1 and 2 report estimation results of splitting the sample according to the industry rate of technical change. Consistent with Hypothesis 1(i), we …nd that the e¤ect of patents on sales is bigger for small than for large …rms in fast-moving industries, while there is no signi…cant di¤erence between large and small …rms in slow-moving industries. The coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between size and patent stock is in fact negative and signi…cant in the former case, and not signi…cant in the latter case.
For publications, we …nd a strong positive e¤ect of …rm size both within fast moving industries and slow moving industries. Thus, the speed of technical progress does not seem to be an important predictor of whether large or small …rms bene…t from basic research.
Process innovation. The cost-spreading argument suggests that large …rms should bene…t more from innovation than small …rms, especially in industries where process innovations are common. Consistent with cost-spreading, we expect the negative patent-size interaction to be larger in absolute value in industries where product innovation is more common, because in these industries the cost-spreading advantage of large …rms is lower, if not completely muted.
We classify industries as product or process innovation industries based on …rms'responses to CMU question 36a: "Over the last three years, for approximately what percent of your R&D unit's product and process innovations did your …rm apply for patents?" An industry is classi…ed as a product innovation industry if its average share of product innovations is above the industry median. Conversely, an industry is classi…ed as a process innovation industry if its average share of product innovations is below the industry median.
Columns 3 and 4 report how the innovation-size relationship varies by process and product innovation industries. Consistent with Hypothesis 1(ii), large size appears to confer additional advantages in industries where process innovations are common. For product innovation industries, the coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between size and patents is negative and large. By contrast, the same coe¢ cient is e¤ectively zero for process innovation industries, suggesting the presence of additional (cost-spreading) advantages of large size. For publications, we …nd a positive and signi…cant size interaction e¤ect for both product and process innovation industries. Thus, the share of process versus product innovations in an industry does not seem to be an important predictor of whether large or small …rms bene…t from basic research.
Complementary assets. Large …rms are more likely than small …rms to rely on complementary assets (Teece, 1986) . Hence large size can be expected to confer greater advantages in industries where complementary assets are deemed to be important. Consistent with complementary assets, we expect the negative patent-size interaction to be larger in absolute value in industries where complementary assets are less important.
We classify industries as high or low in terms of the importance that R&D managers attach to complementary assets based on the response to question 32f: "During the last three years, for what percent of product innovations were each of the following e¤ ective in protecting your …rm's competitive advantage from those innovations? -Complementary manufacturing facilities and know how." We scale the responses to this questions to the response item midpoints to create percentage measures (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%). Based on the response to the questions 46a and 46b on percentage of R&D spent on process and product innovation, we create two variables that re ‡ect the percentage of product and process innovations. The …nal industry measure is computed as the weighted average of the response to question 32f on product innovation and question 33f which is the equivalent question on process innovation.
Columns 5 and 6 report the estimation results of splitting the sample by the importance of complementary assets at the industry level. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1(iii). The coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between size and patents is negative and highly signi…cant in industries where complementary assets are less important, and not signi…cant (essentially zero) in industries where complementary assets are more important. Thus, large …rms appear to enjoy additional appropriability advantages in the latter case. Surprisingly, we …nd that for publications there is a positive and signi…cant size e¤ect in both types of industries. We had expected large …rms to enjoy additional appropriability advantages in industries where complementary assets are more important also for basic research.
Product complexity. In industries where products are composed of several patentable components, cross-licensing agreements are relatively quite common. We expect competition in these industries to revolve more around the possession of complementary assets (often associated with large size) than the ability to enforce exclusivity through patents. Consistent with this view, we expect the negative patentsize interaction to be larger in absolute value in discrete, rather than complex, industries.
We classify industries as either complex or discrete based on …rms' response to CMU question 32g:
"During the last three years, for what percent of your product innovations were each of the following e¤ ective in protecting your …rm's competitive advantage from those innovations?" Complexity is then based on the number of times product complexity is selected by the respondent. We combine this answer with the answer to the equivalent question about process innovation (question 33g). Complexity is computed as the weighted average of the answers to the two questions, where weights are computed based on the response to question 36, which gives us the proportion of R&D that is directed to product or process innovation (as explained above).
Columns 7 and 8 report the estimation results of the sales equation separately for complex and discrete industries. Consistent with Hypothesis 1(iv), we …nd a negative and signi…cant size interaction e¤ect for patents in discrete industries, but a statistically insigni…cant size e¤ect in complex industries. Thus there seem to be additional size advantages in complex industries. For publications, we …nd a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient estimate on size interaction for both complex and discrete industries. 9
Reputation. In addition to the above mechanisms, we can also explore the potential reputational e¤ects of patents and scienti…c publications. Scholars have suggested that patents and publications may enhance the reputation of the sponsoring …rm (Cohen et al., 2000; Hicks, 1995) , thus facilitating sales and …rm growth (Azoulay, 2002) . However, it is not clear whether enhanced reputation should bene…t more large …rms or small …rms. On one hand, reputation may be particularly valuable to small …rms that do not have an established brand name or track record. On the other hand, patents and publications might complement other marketing e¤orts. For instance, in the prescription-drug industry, much advertising is based on and driven by clinical-research outputs (Azoulay, 2002) . To the extent that these marketing e¤orts are mainly undertaken by large …rms, patents and publications might bene…t chie ‡y those …rms.
We examine the reputational e¤ects of patents and publications by classifying industries based on the response to CMU question 38g: "For your R&D unit's application for a product or process patent, which of the following reason motivated the decision to apply for a patent?" -b. To enhance the reputation of the …rm or its R&D employees -Yes or No. We use the industry share of respondents who answer "yes" as our industry measure of the importance of reputation.
Columns 9 and 10 present the estimation results of splitting the sample according to the importance of reputation by industry. The results show that, for patents and especially for publications, interaction coe¢ cients are substantially bigger in high reputation industries than in low reputation industries. Thus, large size appears to be more bene…cial (or at least less detrimental) in industries where reputation is important. This supports the idea that patents and publications might complement large …rms'marketing e¤orts.
Robustness tests
We perform several tests to check the robustness of our results. In this section we report detailed estimation results for selection into innovation, which we view as the main source of potential concern. For the remaining tests, we summarize the key …ndings, but for brevity we do not include them in separate tables.
Selection into innovation
The decision to patent and/or publish may be driven by unobserved characteristics correlated with …rm size. For instance, it could be that small …rms produce on average better innovations than large …rms because they face more severe constraints. Small …rms could face higher unit costs than large …rms when …ling a patent, or the cost of external …nance could be higher for them. Such constraints would lead 9 The mechanism discussed here hinges on the presumption that in complex product industries patents are used for crosslicensing purposes, while in discrete industries they are used to enforce exclusivity. We also explored this idea by looking at the importance of licensing as a motivation for patenting. The results support our presumption that additional size advantages are present in industries where licensing is more common. Details and tables are available from the authors upon request.
to small-…rm selection bias: only the best small …rms that were able to overcome the constraints and come up with an innovation would enter our sample. We investigate this concern by comparing quality measures of patents and publications for small and large …rms. The presence of small-…rm selection bias would imply that patents and publications by small …rms would be of higher average quality than those of large …rms. Table 5 summarizes the comparison between measures of patent quality for patents held by small and large …rms. The main …nding is that both patents and publications held by large …rms are of higher quality than patents by small …rms. For example, a patent by a large …rm (top size quartile) receives on average 1.05 citations, compared to a patent by a small …rm (lower size quartile) that receives on average 0.85 citations (the di¤erence in means is signi…cant at the 1% level). This result is not consistent with the idea that only the best small …rms are able to …nance and patent their projects, and therefore high-quality small …rms are over-represented in our sample. 10 To further test for selection, we use data on …rms that never patent or publish. Restricting our analysis to a sample of patenting or publishing …rms may upward bias the estimated value of patents and publications. For instance, if selection into patenting is such that …rms that do not patent are the ones that are better at protecting their knowledge assets in non-proprietary ways, and if these non-patenting …rms are as productive as patenting …rms, then our patent value estimates would be upward biased (yet, even in this case, it is not clear that the size interactions -the main focus of this paper, would be biased). A similar argument can be made for publications. Non-publishing …rms may still perform basic research. If these …rms are as productive as publishing …rms (especially in the high-end side of the size distribution), our estimated publication value would be upward biased. To check the sensitivity of our results to selection into patenting and publishing, we perform non-parametric estimations using the complete population of …rms -pooling together those …rms that patent or publish, and those …rms that neither patent nor publish.
We include all …rms that report …nancial information, have at least 10 employees, and generate at least $1 million in annual sales. We exclude industries where patenting or publishing is not likely to take place (such as retail, insurance, and legal services). This leaves us with more than 400,000 …rms. Of these …rms about 2% have at least one patent from the EPO, and 0.4% have at least one scienti…c publications.
Using nearest-neighbor propensity-score matching, we non-parametrically estimate the e¤ect of patenting and publishing on labor productivity. For patenting, the dependent variable in the …rst-stage estimation is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for …rms that have at least one patent from the EPO, while for publishing the dependent variable is a dummy that receives the value of one for …rms that have at least one scienti…c publication. First-stage regression controls include number of employees (level and squared), …rm age (years from date of incorporation), complete sets of dummies for three-digit industry SIC codes and countries, and dummies for public …rms and …rms that report only consolidated accounts. Table 6 presents the second-stage estimation results for the whole sample, and separately for size quartiles. The non-parametric estimation results are generally consistent with the parametric results in the restricted innovating-…rm sample. The average labor productivity for patenting …rms is $298 thousand, while for non-patenting …rms it is $253 thousand. Thus, patenting …rms are 18% more productive than non-patenting …rms. For …rms in the …rst size quartile, the productivity gap between patenting and nonpatenting …rms is larger (about 20%) and highly signi…cant. As …rms grow the productivity gap between patenting and non-patenting …rms tends to decrease. For example, for …rms in the fourth size quartile, patenting …rms are only 12% more productive than non-patenting …rms.
Moving to publications, we …nd that publishing …rms are substantially more productive than nonpublishing …rms, with a labor productivity gap of 25%, signi…cant at the 1% level. As in the parametric estimation results, this di¤erence is driven by the larger …rms in the sample. For …rms in the fourth size quartile, the productivity gap between publishing and non-publishing …rms is 27% (signi…cant at the 1% level), while for …rms in the …rst quartile, the gap is only 6%.
Alternative assignments of publications to …rms
We assign a publication to a …rm if the …rm's name appears on the list of author a¢ liations of that article.
There are two potential issues concerning this assignment scheme. First, scienti…c publications usually have more than one author (the average number of authors per publication is 4.2). Second, coauthors often belong to di¤erent organizations. To examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative assignment schemes, we take two steps. First, we divide each publication by the number of distinct a¢ liations that appear on the publication. Thus, publications where a …rm appears to have contributed less (because more institutions are involved) are given less weight. Second, we distinguish between fully corporate publications and publications coauthored with scientists working in universities or other research institutions. This is important because coauthorship of scienti…c papers with academics may measure "connectedness"to the public sector -a potentially valuable form of absorptive capacity (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) . For both the sales and growth speci…cations, the same pattern of results continues to hold when publications are normalized by the number of di¤erent a¢ liations. We also …nd no signi…cant di¤erences between fully corporate publications and publications coauthored with university scientists. Thus, at least in the whole sample of innovating …rms, connectedness to the public sector does not seem to have a large e¤ect on …rm performance.
Additional …rm controls and temporal lag
To mitigate concerns of unobserved heterogeneity, we include additional …rm controls in the sales and growth equations, including …rm age, liquidity (cash ‡ow over assets), and a dummy for whether the …rm belongs to a corporate group. Controlling for …rm age is important because …rm age and …rm size are strongly correlated. Thus there is the risk that the …rm size e¤ects we document may actually capture a "…rm life-cycle"e¤ect. Controlling for liquidity and corporate group a¢ liation is also important as these factors may a¤ect the propensity to patent and publish, as well as a¤ect …rm performance (Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010) . Thus, to control for life-cycle e¤ects we interact …rm age with patents and publications.
To control for liquidity and group a¢ liation, we interact those variables with employment. The size interactions remain robust to including these interaction terms in both sales and growth speci…cations. 11
Our analysis assumes a speci…c structure on how past patenting and publishing a¤ects sales and growth. We check the sensitivity of our results to alternative assumptions by imposing longer lags on patenting and publishing, as well as examining longer periods for employment growth. The same pattern of results continued to hold.
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the composition of innovative activity. Among our estimation sample of innovating …rms, …rms that patent may di¤er from non-patenting …rms in ways that are not picked up by our controls. For example, Gittelman and Kogut (2003) suggest that …rms that are a¢ liated with scientists who both patent and publish should perform better than …rms that are a¢ liated with scientists who engage in only one of these inventive activities. To control for variation in the composition of innovative activity, we estimate the baseline sales and sales growth speci…cations with samples that include only patenting …rms (…rms with at least one patent), publishing …rms (…rms with at least one publication), and …rms that have at least one patent and one publication. We observe no important di¤erences across these subsamples.
Comparison to Compustat
A key advantage of our dataset is the wide coverage of …rms of di¤erent size. To demonstrate this advantage, we estimate the productivity-innovation speci…cations for Compustat …rms and large European …rms -thus focusing only on the high-end side of the size distribution. The sample of Compustat …rms includes all patenting …rms, where patent data are taken from the NBER archive. We follow the same matching procedure as for the European …rms to assign publications to Compustat …rms. The average US …rm in our sample, which covers the period 1980-2001, has 14,843 employees with a median of 2,625 (in our sample, in contrast, the average …rm has 1,111 employees with a median of 87). Table 7 presents the estimation results. In column 1, we regress sales against patent and publication stocks for Compustat …rms. The coe¢ cient estimate on patent stock is negative and statistically insigni…cant , and the coe¢ cient estimate on publication stock is positive and signi…cant. Column 2 adds interactions between patent and publication stocks with lagged employment. None of the interactions are signi…cant. In columns 3-6 we perform similar estimations for large European …rms. We are unable to replicate our key results in any of these speci…cations. 1 1 We also experiment with other potentially important omitted variables. For instance, we include (non-logged) squared term of employment to check whether the innovation-employment interactions are picking up non-linear e¤ect of employment on sales (as higher levels of innovation are correlated with larger size). We also check for non-linear e¤ects of patenting and publishing by including squared terms of each. In both cases there is no evidence that the innovation-employment interactions are picking up non-linear e¤ects of either size or innovation.
Discussion and Conclusion
Using a novel and comprehensive dataset, this paper investigates how size mediates …rms'ability to appropriate the bene…ts from innovation. We distinguish between output indicators of applied research and output indicators of basic research, respectively, using patents and scienti…c publications in "hard science" journals. By focusing on di¤erent types of …rms (large and small) and di¤erent types of innovations (basic and applied), this paper makes three important contributions.
First, we demonstrate that the ability of large and small …rms to appropriate the bene…ts from innovation depends crucially on the "basicness" of their research activities. We …nd that large …rms bene…t the most from the outputs of basic research, while small …rms are the ones that bene…t the most from the outputs of applied research. Previous work on …rm size and innovation has largely focused on either patents (applied research) or aggregate levels of R&D expenditures, and has generally produced inconclusive or contradictory results (Cohen, 2010) . By distinguishing between basic and applied research outputs, this paper suggests that these studies may have inappropriately aggregated the e¤ects of di¤erent types of investments. Another issue with prior work has been the focus on very big …rms, which may not be representative of the whole …rm size distribution (Cohen, 2010) . We address this in our sample, where about 10 percent of the innovating …rms have fewer than 8 employees and less than $1.5 million in annual sales. We demonstrate the importance of wide coverage by showing that none of our key results can be replicated by restricting attention to the largest European …rms or by using Compustat data.
There are very few studies that compare the appropriability of applied and basic research. Our …ndings broadly support Nelson's (1959) conjecture that large …rms are the ones best positioned to exploit the outcomes of basic research, and con…rm Griliches's (1986) classic result of a "basic research premium"for very large …rms. From a broader perspective, our results underscore the dangers of drawing very strong conclusions based solely on patent-based indicators of inventive activity. As our evidence indicates, large and small …rms may in fact have a comparative advantage at di¤erent types of inventive activities.
The second contribution of the paper is to investigate the mechanisms through which …rm size matters. It has long been recognized that size might be correlated with a number of more fundamental appropriability mechanisms such as …rst-mover advantage and complementary assets. Previous research on appropriability mechanisms has demonstrated that the traditional emphasis on patents as a way to appropriate the returns from innovation is often misplaced (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000) . Firms rely on a number of appropriability mechanisms, most notably …rst-mover advantages, secrecy, and complementary assets, to appropriate the returns from their innovations. While our …ndings support the view that appropriability is driven by several coexisting mechanisms, they also suggest that the importance of these mechanisms may vary depending on the "basicness" of research. The appropriability of applied research (captured by patents) appears to be a¤ected by mechanisms such as large …rms' inertia, costspreading advantages, and complementary assets. Conversely, these mechanisms do not seem to play a very important role for basic research. Instead, the main e¤ect of publishing in scienti…c journals (our measure of basic research) appears to be that of enhancing the sponsoring …rm's reputation, as stressed by some scholars (Hicks, 1995; Azoulay, 2002) . Moreover, because on average, small …rms bene…t from patents more than large …rms, especially in dynamic environments, our evidence suggests that the most important appropriability mechanism for applied research is the ability to overcome organizational inertia.
This last …nding lends some support to a key tenet of competitive dynamics research, namely that speed and "aggressiveness"are key sources of competitive advantage in high-velocity environments (Eisenhardt, 1989; D'Aveni, 1994) .
Finally, this paper shows that the incentives for …rms to publish (and by proxy to engage in basic research) are quite complex. Firm publications are often regarded as a measure of the "basicness" of patented knowledge (Murray, 2002; Murray and Stern, 2006) . We do …nd evidence in support of that view. For instance, we …nd that patents by publishing …rms tend to be more general and original than patents by non-publishing …rms. However, …rm publications cannot simply be regarded as a by-product of the patenting process. More than half of the articles we identify belong to …rms that never patent.
The idea that the knowledge in a patent may often be inscribed in a publication (Murray and Stern's 'patent-paper hypothesis') is also di¢ cult to reconcile with our …nding that patents and publications have markedly di¤erent e¤ects on performance depending on …rm size.
If publications cannot simply be regarded as a by-product of the patenting process, we must continue to search for alternative explanations for the prevalence of this activity. Because valuable information may leak out to competitors, in fact, publishing in academic journals is inherently risky. As already mentioned, our evidence points to enhanced reputation as an important bene…t of publishing. We …nd that large …rms especially gain from publications, relative to small …rms, in industries where reputation is important. This indicates that publications may complement large …rms' marketing and sale e¤orts (Azoulay, 2002) .
We acknowledge that small and large …rms may publish for very di¤erent reasons. A puzzling …nding of our analysis is that small …rms hold a substantial fraction of …rm publications (9%, compared to only 2.5% for patents) despite apparently getting very little out of them, and often even appearing to sacri…ce sales and growth prospects in order to publish. It is possible that many small …rms publish because of their owners'preferences. They might be run by scientists/entrepreneurs who have internalized the norms of science, or care about their personal academic reputations (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stern, 2004) .
Small …rms may also publish to signal scienti…c or technical competence and become more attractive targets for acquisitions or partnerships (Higgins et al., 2011) . These bene…ts could partially explain small …rms' high propensity to publish. Investigating these issues is clearly an important direction for future research.
There are of course limitations to our work. Although we provide robust correlations between performance, size, and multiple indicators of innovative activity, we fall well short of proving causality. For instance, it could be that because patenting is costly, small …rms only patent their best ideas. This would suggest that patents by small …rms are on average of higher quality, thus potentially biasing our results. Basic research could also be a "luxury" that only the best large …rms can a¤ord. We attempt to address these concerns using propensity-score matching techniques and by analyzing growth rates rather than levels. We also tease out some of the causal mechanisms that may generate the …rm size e¤ects we observe. However, more work is certainly needed to address the issue of causality.
A second limitation is that some important determinants of appropriability could not be empirically examined. Nelson's (1959) conjecture is based on the presumption that large …rms'broad technological base helps them …nd valuable commercial applications for the unpredictable outcomes of basic research. Henderson and Cockburn (1996) and Cockburn and Henderson (2001) also emphasize the importance of scope economies in drug discovery and commercialization. However, our accounting data from Amadeus does not provide information on …rm diversi…cation. Future research, building on the seminal work of Henderson and Cockburn, should investigate the role of scope economies in appropriating the bene…ts of basic and applied research.
We conclude by summarizing the main managerial implications of the paper. These implications di¤er depending on …rm type (large or small) and innovation type (applied or basic). Small …rms appear to bene…t from applied research (patents), while they may have to forgo opportunities for sales and further growth in order to publish. When evaluating the opportunity to engage with the broader scienti…c community, small …rms should carefully weigh these costs against the potential bene…ts of publishing, such as the ability to attract better scientists, or the ability to broadcast …rm capabilities to prospective business partners.
Our …nding that large …rms bene…t less from applied research, especially in dynamic environments, suggests that many large (European) …rms should redesign their internal structures to promote speedy actions. While in fact large size may lead to inertia or complacency, the connection is neither simple nor deterministic. The experience of many successful …rms such as Apple and Oracle demonstrates that it is possible to be both entrepreneurial and big. Large …rms should also nurture and exploit their strengths, particularly those related to the possession of complementary assets and the appropriability of process innovations. Lastly, large …rms appear to bene…t greatly from basic research, apparently due in part to enhanced reputation in the marketplace. Gaining a better understanding of how both large and small …rms can manage their reputational assets is an important direction for future research. 
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY BETWEEN PUBLISHING AND NON-PUBLISHING FIRMS ACROSS FIRM SIZE CLASSES
Note: This figure plots percentage differences in labor productivity (sales per employee) between high-and low-patenting firms across quintiles of number of employees. A firm is assumed to be a high-(low-) patenting firm if its number of patents is higher (lower) than the sample median number of patents.
Note: This figure plots percentage differences in labor productivity (sales per employee) between publishing and non-publishing firms across quintiles of number of employees. 
Process Slow
Notes: This table examines how the relationship between innovation and productivity varies by industry characteristics. All regressions include complete sets of three-digit industry, year, and country dummies. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%. Notes: This table reports the results of non-parametric propensity-score matching estimations for the relation between patenting and publishing and labor productivity. The sample covers all firms in Amadeus that report accounting information, have more than 10 employees, and generate at least $1 million in annual sales. The estimation is cross-sectional for the most recent year firms report accounting. For patenting, the dependent variable in the first-stage regression is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for firms that have at least one patent from the EPO. For publishing, the dependent variable is a dummy that receives the value of one for firms that have at least one publication. All first-stage regressions include the following controls: number of employees (level and squared), firm age (years from date of incorporation), complete sets of dummies for three-digit industry SIC codes and countries, and dummies for public firms and firms that report only consolidated accounts. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 10%.
(1) 1978 and 2006 . For the U.S., the sample covers the period 1980-2001 and includes only firms with at least one patent from the USPTO or a publication over the period . The sample included in columns 4-6 matches the average number of employees for the sample of Compustat firms. All regressions include a complete set of year dummies. Columns 3-6 include an additional set of country dummies. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%
